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Abstract: In this paper we
investigate the extent to which
formal argumentation models can
handle ten basic characteristics of
informal logic identified in the
informal logic literature. By showing
how
almost
all
of
these
characteristics can be successfully
modelled formally, we claim that
good progress can be made toward
the project of formalizing informal
logic. Of the formal argumentation
models available, we chose the
Carneades Argumentation System
(CAS), a formal, computational
model of argument that uses
argument graphs as its basis,
structures of a kind very familiar to
practitioners of informal logic
through their use of argument
diagrams.

Resumé: Dans cet article nous
examinons la mesure dans laquelle
des
représentations
formelles
d'argumentation peuvent formuler
dix caractéristiques de base de la
logique non formelle identifiées
dans la littérature de la logique non
formelle. En montrant comment la
quasi-totalité de ces caractéristiques
peuvent
être
représentées
formellement avec succès, nous
prétendons que des progrès peuvent
être accomplis vers le projet de
formaliser la logique non formelle.
Parmi
les
représentations
d'argumentation disponibles, nous
avons choisi le système Carneades
Argumentation
(SCA),
une
représentation de calcul formel
d'argument qui utilise des schémas
d’argument comme sa base, qui sont
très familiers aux praticiens de la
logique non formelle qui emploient
des diagrammes pour représenter la
structure des arguments.

Keywords: informal logic; formal argumentation systems; real arguments;
premise acceptability; conductive argument; RSA triangle; relevance;
sufficiency.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate the extent to which formal
argumentation models can handle ten characteristics of informal
logic identified in the literature. We show how almost all of
these characteristics can be successfully modelled formally, and
on this basis we claim that good progress is being made toward
the goal of formalizing informal logic. This is to assume that
one accepts that these ten characteristics are sufficient, defining
characteristics of informal logic. Seen in another way then, our
analysis may open the way for further discussion to identifying
other defining conditions of informal logic, which may or may
not be amenable to formalization.
To begin then, we need to decide what requirements
something has to meet to be an informal logic. We take the
following ten characteristics of informal logic as our guide. (1)
Informal logic recognizes the linked-convergent distinction, (2)
serial arguments and (3) divergent arguments. Informal logic
includes three postulates of good argument in the RSA triangle:
(4) relevance, (5) premise acceptability and (6) sufficiency. (7)
Informal logic has recognized the importance of pro-contra
(conductive) arguments. (8) Informal logic is concerned with
analyzing real arguments. Johnson (2006, 246) expressed this
characteristic as follows: “[Informal logic] may be seen as a turn
toward seeing argument in a real-life setting as opposed to the
artificiality of the examples associated with formal deductive
logic”. There is also a ninth characteristic, (9) the appreciation
of the importance of argument construction: “If one is to teach
students about real arguments, then it is not enough to focus
only on evaluation; one must include the task of argument
construction—an emphasis taken from colleagues in rhetoric”
Johnson (2006, 248). Argument construction was traditionally
called the art of argument invention in rhetoric (Kienpointner,
1997). (10) There is also a tenth characteristic, one that is very
important for rhetoric, the notion of audience. Blair (2001, 366)
stated that there is general agreement among argumentation
scholars that argumentation is a complex social, speech activity
involving more than one party, adding “One cannot argue
without at least an imaginary audience or interlocutor”.
The fulfillment of these particular conditions by a formal
system justifies our hypothesis that informal logic can be
formalized because, as shown by our survey of the literature in
search of definitions of informal logic, although no definition
was found which enjoys broad consensus, the ten characteristics
identified play a central role in all the proposed definitions.
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Thus a formal model that exhibits all of these characteristics
would satisfy all of the proposed definitions, without having to
accept any one definition in particular. This however leaves
open the possibility that none of the definitions proposed thus
far are adequate, leading to continued discussion to search for
other characteristics and a new definition. However, in this
paper we do not consider if there are any other conditions whose
fulfillment allows for a better formalization. Instead of trying to
define informal logic ourselves, we limited our task to the
question of the amount of progress made toward formalizing
informal logic as it is defined in the literature.
The word ‘formal’, as used in writings on logic and
philosophy, can have seven different meanings. One of these
meanings, distinguished by Barth and Krabbe (1982, 14-15), is
that of a fundamental general term for a concept. For example,
one might cite the term ‘triangle’, which in the Platonic
philosophy refers to a general concept of triangularity that is
common to all triangles. The second meaning is that of a wellformed formula, for example in a propositional or predicate
logic. This meaning is syntactic in nature. The third meaning is
that of a formal system, with a set of axioms and inference rules
used to derive theorems from the axioms. The fourth meaning
refers to formal logic, which is a species of a formal system. A
fifth meaning is that of a formal theory, that is, an
axiomatization of a theory in a formal logic. A sixth meaning is
that of a mathematical structure consisting of sets and operations
on the sets. An example would be an algebraic structure. The
seventh meaning is that of a formal procedure, for example the
kinds of procedures used in court cases.
There are many automated systems to assist with argument
diagramming (Scheuer et al., 2010). CAS, however has one of
the few argument diagramming tools based on a formal,
computational model of argument. CAS is named after the
Greek skeptical philosopher Carneades (Gordon and Walton,
2006), and is open source software, available for downloading at
http://carneades.github.io/. The point is worth emphasizing that
there are formal systems other than calculi for classical logic,
and that CAS is a formal, computational model of argument. It
is computational, because the model consists of a mathematical
structure whose operations are all computable. It is formal,
because there is a formal calculus for computable functions
(lambda calculus). The rest of this paper presents CAS in more
detail and then shows how CAS can be understood as a
formalization of informal logic, realizing all of its leading
characteristics.
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There are other formal argumentation systems that have
been developed in computer science to analyze and evaluate
argumentation and that use argument diagrams and other tools
comparable to those used in CAS (Besnard et al., 2014). Any
one of these systems could be used to formalize argumentation
of the kind we have identified as being centrally important for
informal logic in our ten characteristics of informal logic. An
important property of these systems is that they use
argumentation schemes, and although they are quite capable of
modeling deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning of certain
kinds, like CAS they treat many argumentation schemes as
representing forms of argument that are inherently defeasible
(Verheij, 2003; Prakken, 2011). Again, like CAS, they formally
model the conditions under which an argument can be either
supported or defeated by the pro and con arguments in a given
case.
One such system ASPIC+ (Modgil and Prakken, 2014), is
built around the notion of defeasibility attributed to (Pollock,
1995), that is based on a distinction between two types of
argument attacks called undercutters and rebutters. ASPIC+ is
based on a logical language consisting of a set of strict and
defeasible inference rules used to build arguments from a
knowledge base of premises that can be combined with the
inference rules to generate a sequence of argumentation in the
form of a directed graph leading to an ultimate conclusion in a
tree structure (Prakken, 2011). The logical system DefLog
(Verheij, 2003, 2005) uses an argument diagramming tool called
ArguMed that can be used to analyze and evaluate defeasible
argumentation. This logical system is built around two
connectives called primitive defeasible implication and
dialectical negation.
Either of these systems can be used to do many of the
same tasks that CAS will be shown to do in this paper. There are
also many more resources available in artificial intelligence that
could also be applied to the task of formalizing informal logic,
in somewhat different ways, by using comparable tools that
would produce comparable results in modeling typical tasks of
argument evaluation and analysis carried out in informal logic.
2. The Carneades Argumentation System
CAS formalizes argument graphs, as bipartite, directed graphs,
consisting of argument nodes linked to statement nodes. The
CAS User Manual for the latest version can be found at
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https://carneades.github.io. A graph is defined mathematically as
a set of vertices, also called points or nodes, and a set of edges,
also called lines or arcs. The graph is called a directed graph if
every pair of its elements is an ordered pair. CAS argument
graphs model relationships among arguments and statements
(propositions). CAS can be used for argument construction as
well as argument reconstruction. In the species of argument
reconstruction familiar in informal logic, arguments are
identified and analyzed, typically using an argument diagram,
from source documents, for example court documents or social
or political commentaries of the kind found in magazines
newspapers, or on the Internet. In argument construction, also
called argument invention (Walton and Gordon, 2012),
arguments represented in an argument graph can be extended to
build up new arguments constructed from a knowledge base
consisting of evidence and facts. Argument nodes are of two
types, pro and con. Carneades argument diagrams (or maps)
visualize the arguments found in such sources as argument
graphs. Conceptually it is important to distinguish such
visualizations from the underlying mathematical structure being
visualized. Argument graphs can be visualized in different ways
and levels of abstraction, for different purposes.
Argument graphs model inferential relationships among
arguments and statements. An argument graph is a bipartite,
directed, labeled graph, consisting of statement nodes and
argument nodes connected by premise and conclusion edges.
Formally, an argument graph is a 4-tuple ⟨!, A, P, !⟩, where ! is
a set of statement nodes, ! is a set of argument nodes, ! is a set
of premises, and ! is a set of conclusions. The 4-tuple does not
model a single argument, but rather a set of arguments, a whole
argument graph. A single argument is a subgraph of the
argument graph, where the subgraph is a tree (no cycles) and
none of the leaves of the tree are issues but rather assumed to be
true or false or rejected or accepted by the audience.
To see an example, look ahead to figure 3. The statement
nodes are shown as the rectangular text boxes in the figure
containing statements. The argument nodes are the two circles
containing the plus signs. The two premises are the statements in
the text boxes on the right. The conclusion is the statement that
the death penalty is wrong.
Let ! be a propositional language, consisting of a set of
propositional letters. Each statement node in ! is labeled with a
propositional letter in the language !. Each argument node in !
is a structure ⟨id, !, d⟩, where id is some unique term naming the
argument and ! is a Boolean value which is true if the argument
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node is strict and false if it is defeasible. ! is also a Boolean
value, representing the direction of the argument, which is true
if the argument is pro its conclusion and false if it is con its
conclusion. The premises and conclusions of an argument graph
represent the edges of the graph, connecting the statement and
argument nodes.
Each premise in ! is a structure ⟨!, !, !⟩, where
1
2
3

1
2

!∈!,
!∈!,
! is a Boolean value denoting the polarity of the
premise, i.e. positive or negative. If ! is true, then the
premise is positive, otherwise it is negative.
Each conclusion in ! is a structure ⟨!, s⟩, where
!∈!, and
!∈!

Every argument node has exactly one conclusion. That is, for
every argument !∈! there exists exactly one ⟨_!,_⟩∈!. An
argument node may have zero or more premises. No two
argument nodes in an argument graph have the same identifier.
Argument graphs are evaluated, relative to audiences, to
determine the acceptability of statements in a stage (Gordon and
Walton, 2009). Audiences are modeled as a set of assumptions
and an assignment of weights to argument nodes. A literal is
either a propositional variable or its negation. Where L is a
propositional language as defined above, an audience is a
structure <assumptions, weight>, where assumptions ⊆ L is a
consistent set of literals assumed to be acceptable by the
audience and weight is a partial function mapping arguments to
real numbers in the range 0.0...1.0, representing the relative
weights assigned by the audience to the arguments (Gordon and
Walton, 2011). More recently we have found a method to
evaluate cyclical argument graphs in a way compatible with the
semantics of the original system, via a mapping from argument
graphs to Dung abstract argumentation frameworks (Dung
1995), similar to the mapping of ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010; Bin
and Prakken, 2012).
In (Gordon, Prakken & Walton, 2007) the acceptability of
statements was defined directly, via a set of mutually recursive
functions, but only for acyclic argument graphs. Conflicts
between pro and con arguments are resolved using proof
standards. The proof standard of a statement determines how
much proof is required for the statement to be taken as
© Douglas Walton and Thomas F. Gordon. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2015), pp. 508–538.
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acceptable (presumably true). The proof standard is used by the
formal model argument to determine the acceptability of the
statement. Proof standards have a legal flavor, and the notions of
proof standards and burdens of proof modeled in CAS are
motivated by an interest in legal applications. Several legal
standards of proof exist, for example the preponderance of the
evidence standard, also known as the balance of probabilities,
the standard applicable in civil cases. The preponderance
standard is met by the proposition at issue if its pro arguments
are stronger than its con arguments, no matter how much
stronger they may be. The beyond reasonable doubt standard,
the highest standard used in Anglo-American jurisprudence, and
the standard applicable in criminal law, requires that the
arguments supporting the claim must not be amenable to any
opposing arguments from critical questions that can leave any
doubt open on whether the claim is acceptable. This standard
does not require a proof to show that a claim is true with
absolute certainty. It is not a standard of beyond all doubt. It
only needs to be strong enough to overcome a reasonable doubt
that can be raised by arguments or questions put forward by the
defense. The clear and convincing evidence standard, lying
between the other two standards, is higher than the
preponderance of the evidence standard but not as high as the
beyond reasonable doubt standard. These are just some
examples of standards of evidence that are applicable in legal
argumentation. The standards modelled in CAS are defined
more precisely in section 6, where the question of how CAS
models argument sufficiency is raised.
CAS also formalizes argumentation schemes. Schemes
can be used to construct or reconstruct arguments, as well as to
check whether arguments are “valid”, i.e. whether they properly
instantiate the types of argument deemed normatively
appropriate for the type of dialogue. In CAS, argument
evaluation is the process of critically assessing arguments by
four means: (1) revealing implicit premises, (2) validating
whether the arguments are formally correct, by instantiating
accepted argumentation schemes, (3) asking critical questions
appropriate for a scheme, and (4) determining which claims are
acceptable, taking into consideration the assumptions of the
audience and its assessment of the relative weights of conflicting
pro and con arguments. The first three of these tasks can be
accomplished by comparing the argument with its
argumentation scheme.
You can view a list of the argumentation schemes
available in CAS and choose which one to apply. For example if
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you type in the term ‘practical-reasoning’, CAS will display the
scheme containing this term, as shown below. A1, A2, . . ., An
represent actions and S1, S2, . . ., Sn represents “states” which
we can think of as circumstances of a case. The argument
identifier is represented by an id.
id: practical-reasoning
conclusion: A1 should be performed.
premises:
circumstances: S1 is currently the case.
action: Performing A1 in S1 would bring about S2.
goal: G would be realized in S2.
value: Achieving G would promote V.
assumptions:
CQ1: V is indeed a legitimate value.
CQ2: G is a worthy goal.
CQ3: Action A1 is possible.
exceptions:
CQ4: There exists an action that, when performed in S1, would
bring about S2 more effectively than A1.
CQ5: There exists an action that, when performed in S1, would
realize G more effectively than A1.
CQ6: There exists an action that, when performed in S1, would
promote V more effectively than A1.
CQ7: Performing A1 in S1 would have side-effects
which demote V or some other value.

Whenever a scheme is selected, the form will be customized to
include premises and exceptions fields for the chosen scheme.
The roles of the premises and exceptions will be modified to
match the selected scheme. If no scheme matches the argument
in a given text you are trying to reconstruct, you can put in your
own scheme, put in no scheme, or classify the type of argument
under a more general scheme such as deductive modus ponens
or defeasible modus ponens.
CAS is capable of representing instances of any kind of
argumentation scheme, whether deductive, inductive or
defeasible, such as argument from expert opinion. The
conclusion of a defeasible argument is only presumptively true.
Defeasible arguments can be defeated by counterarguments of
various kinds. CAS has mainly been tested on examples of legal
argumentation, but it is open domain software, meaning that it
can be applied in other contexts of use, including everyday
conversational argumentation.
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3. Single, linked, convergent, serial and
divergent arguments
The first step in understanding an argument diagramming system is to see how it represents linked and convergent arguments.
A linked argument is one where the two (or more) premises go
together to support the conclusion. A convergent argument is
one where each premise (or group of premises) function together
to support the conclusion.
As types of structures that appear in argument diagrams,
informal logic recognizes five kinds of arguments, single,
linked, convergent, serial and divergent. In the simplest kind of
case, called the single argument, there is only one premise and
one conclusion (Walton, 1996, 84). The following example of a
single argument is cited in (Walton, 1996, 84).
Webb was promoted to vice president, therefore she will
move to Pittsburgh.

How this example is represented by CAS is shown in figure 1,
where the plus symbol in the argument node indicates that this is
a pro argument. CAS uses a minus sign in the argument node to
indicate a con argument.

Webb will move
to Pittsburgh.

Webb was promoted
to vice-president.

Figure 1: Single argument in Carneades

A linked argument is an argument that has more than one
premise, and its premises function together to give support to
the conclusion (Walton 1996, 85). According to (Copi and Cohen, 1990, 20) in a linked argument with two premises, each
premise supports the conclusion through the mediation of the
other so that neither supports the conclusion independently. One
of the examples given in (Walton, 1996, 87) is an instance of
practical reasoning.
My goal is to get to Leiden, taking the maaldrift is the way
to get to Leiden, therefore I should take the maaldrift:
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I should take
the Maaldrift.

My goal is to
get to Leiden.
+p

Taking the Maaldrift is
the way to get to Leiden.

Figure 2: Linked argument in Carneades

The letter p in the circular argument node stands for the argumentation scheme for practical reasoning. The plus sign in the
node indicates that the argument fitting the scheme is a pro argument. The practical reasoning scheme (in its bare-bones form)
represents the following form of argument: I (an agent) have a
goal G; carrying out action A is the way to obtain G; therefore I
should carry out A.
In a convergent argument each premise gives independent
support to the conclusion. An example (paraphrased from Copi
and Cohen, 1990, 22) has the conclusion that the death penalty
is wrong. The two premises given to support this conclusion are
(1) there is not enough evidence to show that the death penalty
is a deterrent and (2) there are better and more effective ways to
deal with violent crime.

The death
penalty is wrong.

There is not enough evidence to show
that the death penalty is a deterrent.
There are better and more effective
ways to deal with violent crime.

Figure 3: Convergent argument in Carneades

As indicated in figure 3, convergent arguments are represented using multiple argument nodes, instead of using a bracketing line to join the premises together and then drawing the arrow from the bracketing line to the conclusion.
In a serial argument, often called a chain argument, the
conclusion of one argument also functions as a premise in a second argument, and so forth, forming a chain of arguments.
Typical Carneades argument maps display lots of chained arguments, as the example in figure 4 shows.
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Figure 4: CAS argument map with a chained
argumentation structure

This map includes an example of a con argument, indicated by the minus sign in the node at the bottom left. It also shows
a chained argument. The linked argument at the right, an argument from expert opinion, leads to the conclusion that the portrait showed evidence of being drawn by a left handed artist.
This proposition, in turn, serves as a premise in the linked con
argument rebutting the conclusion that painting P is a Klimt.
This example can also be used to illustrate some points about
how CAS evaluates arguments.
The top argument is also an argument from expert opinion. Note that although argumentation schemes are not displayed
in figure 4, they are represented in the underlying data model of
the argument graph. Note that the scheme for argument from
expert opinion could be applied to two arguments, in each instance showing that there is a missing premise. For example the
implicit premise ‘Attributing painting P is in the domain of art’
can be added to the top argument.
Figure 4 can also be used to illustrate how an argument
graph can be evaluated by the computational model. Statement
and argument nodes are evaluated to be one of three values: in,
out, or undecided. In figure 4, the five in nodes representing
statements that the audience accepts, are shown filled with gray
(green normally, but since we can’t use color here, they are
shown in gray). Statements that the audience rejects, out nodes,
are filled with a red color, but none of these are shown in this
example. The two statements that the audience neither accepts
nor rejects, undecided nodes, are shown with a white background. The values of the remaining statement nodes are computed using proof standards and the weights assigned by the audience to the argument nodes. Whether a proposition is in or out
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initially is determined by whether or not the audience accepts it.
In figure 4, the audience has accepted all the five propositions
shown in boxes with gray backgrounds. The only propositions
the audience does not accept (at least so far) are the two shown
with white backgrounds. Given this information about what the
audience accepts or does not, CAS can calculate whether the
argument justifies acceptance of its conclusion or not.
In this instance, both premises of the top linked argument
are accepted, and so the conclusion should also be accepted, assuming this argument meets its standard of proof and is therefore sufficient to prove the conclusion. Just on this basis alone,
the conclusion should be shown as accepted by showing it with
a gray background. But this argument is not sufficient to justify
acceptance of the conclusion that the paining is a Klimt, because
the con argument at the bottom also has to be taken into account.
So we have to look at the bottom argument. The bottom premise, the statement that P was painted by a left handed artist, is
shown as ‘not accepted’ by the audience. But it is supported by
the con argument showing at the right, a linked argument that
has both premises accepted. Therefore CAS automatically computes that proposition ‘P was painted by a left-handed artist’ is
justified, and colors it gray. So now we have a pro argument
with all its premises accepted pitted against a con argument with
all its premises accepted. Which one wins the battle of the experts? This will depend on two factors: (1) the standards of
proof assigned each of the two arguments, and a weighing of the
comparative strength of the two arguments. Later it will be
shown how this is done.
A divergent argument (Walton 1996, 91) is one in which
two separate conclusions are each supported by the same premise. The following example from (Walton, 1996, 91) was originally taken from a Sherlock Holmes story. Smith is not the murderer, therefore (1) Robinson had nothing to do with the crime,
and (2) Lady Gregg’s display of grief was merely a tactic to
cover up the finding of the revolver. Figure 5 shows how divergent arguments are modeled in Carneades.

Lady Gregg’s display of
grief was a mere tactic.
Smith is not
a murderer.
Robinson had nothing
to do with the crime.

Figure 5: Carneades argument map of a divergent argument
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In CAS, premises and conclusions are relations between
argument nodes and statement nodes. The same statement node
can be a premise or conclusion of more than one argument node.
Figures 3 and 5 provide illustrations. In Figure 3, the statement
node for “The death penalty is wrong” is a conclusion of two
argument nodes, with different premises. In Figure 5, the statement node for “Smith is not a murderer” is a premise of two different argument nodes, with different conclusions.
Finally in this section, we reply to an objection. Can CAS
handle the following kind of convergent argument, where the
premises support the conclusion independently? The conclusion
is “Foreigner X can communicate in English” and the two premises are “X has CAE” and “X has CPE”, where CAE is the Certificate in Advanced English and CPE is the Certificate of Proficiency in English. Both premises treated separately as single arguments support the conclusion, but since CPE is a much weaker and more restricted test of English linguistic ability than
CAE, taken together as a convergent argument they do not support the conclusion independently. The influence of CAE is
marginal, if it has any at all. Can CAS allow for representation
of the argumentation structure in this kind of case?
CAS can handle this example, since it does not assume
that arguments are independent. Argument weights are not automatically aggregated (e.g. summed) by the model. Only the
strongest pro and con arguments are compared against each other by the proof standards. Arguments can be aggregated manually and then weighed again, but this weighing is done manually
by the audience, not the formal model, and it is the audience’s
responsibility to not count common features of the arguments
multiple times.
4. The RSA Triangle
Blair (2012, 87) wrote that when he and Ralph Johnson first
wrote their textbook Logical Self-defense (first edition, 1977),
they used the relevance sufficiency acceptability (RSA) triangle
to determine whether an argument is a good one. According to
the RSA principle, an argument is a good one if its grounds (or
premises) singly or in combination meet three criteria. First, the
premises have to be individually acceptable. Second, taken together the premises have to be sufficient to support the claim
that is the conclusion of the argument. Third, the argument
needs to be relevant as a support for the conclusion. Blair (2012,
88) wrote that he and Johnson had the RSA criteria in mind as a

© Douglas Walton and Thomas F. Gordon. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2015), pp. 508–538.

Formalizing Informal Logic 521
replacement for what he called the traditional soundness criterion, which maintains that a good argument is a sound argument,
and a sound argument is one that is deductively valid and has
true premises.
Formal argumentation systems of the kind currently being
developed in artificial intelligence use argumentation schemes to
model defeasible forms of argument that are subject to critical
questioning. Such systems evaluate an argument as a good one
or not on a balance of pro and con considerations. The model
used is a dialectical one in which an argument that is a good one
shifts the burden of proof to a critic or opponent to provide reasons for not accepting it. In particular CAS evaluates an argument in relation to whether the premises of the argument are accepted by the audience to whom the argument was directed, and
the appropriate inferential link joining the premises to a conclusion, generally represented as an argumentation scheme, transferring acceptance from the premises to the conclusion.
5. Acceptability
A simple example of how CAS uses the device of an audience to
evaluate arguments is shown in figure 6. Let’s consider a case of
a deliberation dialogue where Bob has acid indigestion and is
considering taking a medication M to treat his condition. He is
examining the pros and cons in trying to reach a reasonable decision on whether he should take M or not. He has a bottle of M
handy and is trying to decide what to do. Bob might reason as
shown in figure 6. Let’s say that Bob is thinking that if he takes
M, it would relieve his acid indigestion. He tells his partner Alice, “I should take M”. Using the argumentation scheme for value-based practical reasoning presented in section 2 to fill in
some implicit premises, Bob’s reasoning could be represented in
CAS as shown in figure 6.

I have acid
indigestion.
I should
take M.

+p

My goal is to treat
my acid indigestion.

Health is a
value for me.

Taking M would treat
my acid indigestion.

Figure 6: First argument diagram for the indigestion example
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Notice that this way of modeling the argument follows the
standard way of representing value-based practical reasoning
(Atkinson, Bench-Capon and McBurney, 2006). On this model,
the value of health is shown as supporting the agent’s goal of
treating his acid indigestion. When premises are put forward to
support a claim, in an example of this sort, the normal premises
that fit the scheme are represented as assumptions rather than
exceptions. Critics only need to question assumptions, after
which they act like ordinary premises which must be proved by
the proponent of the argument. (This is how assumptions differ
from exceptions, where the critic has the burden of proof (evidential burden) and must put forward an argument proving the
exception.) So the four premises of the practical reasoning argument are displayed in text boxes with gray backgrounds, indicating audience acceptance. Since the argument fits the scheme
for value-based practical reasoning, let’s also assume that the
audience accepts the argument strongly enough to meet the required standard of proof to prove the conclusion ‘I should take
M’ shown at the left of figure 6. So far then, the outcome is that
CAS replaces the white background of the conclusion box with
a gray background.
But let’s continue the dialogue a little further. Suppose
that Alice reads the small print on the bottle, and sees that it
warns that taking M could have a side effect of gastrointestinal
bleeding. Here the side-effects critical question CQ7, shown in
the CAS scheme presented in section 2, comes into play. CQ7 is
listed as an exception, and it says that performing A1 in S1
would have side-effects which demote V or some other value.
So how could one proceed further to represent the structure of
the new sequence of argumentation? By raising a critical question, Alice’s next move in the dialogue in effect poses a counterargument, and therefore we have to examine how CAS treats
critical questions and counterarguments.
In the most recent versions of CAS, exceptions are treated
as Pollock-style undercutters. (Pollock, 1995) distinguished between two kinds of counter-arguments he called rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters (often referred to as rebutters
and undercutters). A rebutter gives a reason for denying a claim
by offering reasons to think it is false (Pollock, 1995, 40). An
undercutter attacks the inferential link between the claim and the
reason supporting it by undermining the reason that supported
the claim. CAS has three ways in which one argument can attack and defeat another, based on this distinction. A rebutter is
an argument that attacks the conclusion of a prior argument by
presenting a reason to think the conclusion is false. An undercut-
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ter attacks the argument link between the premises and the conclusion, for example by asking a critical question pointing to an
exception to the holding of the argument. For example, an argument that fits the argumentation scheme for argument from
practical reasoning could be defeated by the asking of any one
of the critical questions shown in section 2.
6. Sufficiency
CAS is built around the idea of modeling sufficiency by using
proof standards to aggregate pro and con arguments (Gordon,
Prakken and Walton, 2007). The proof standard of a statement
determines how much proof is required for the statement to be
deemed acceptable (presumably true). The proof standard is
used by the computational model of argument to compute the
acceptability of the statement (Gordon and Walton, 2009). As
promised in section 2, it will now be shown how four proof
standards employed in CAS are defined.
The conclusion of an argument is in (acceptable) if it has
been accepted by the audience or it satisfies the proof standard
appropriate for the type of dialogue. The standard of dialectical
validity (DV) is met if at least one pro argument is in and no con
argument is in. The preponderance of evidence (PE) standard is
met if at least one pro argument is in that weighs more than
any in con argument. The clear and convincing evidence (CE)
standard is met if the preponderance of evidence standard is met
and, in addition, the difference between the strongest in pro argument and the strongest in con argument is above a certain
threshold.
The beyond reasonable doubt (BRD) standard is met if the
clear and convincing evidence standard is met and, in addition,
the weight of the weakest in con argument is below a certain
threshold. The default proof standard is preponderance of the
evidence, and for most applications this proof standard is sufficient. Note that the preponderance of evidence standard is met
whenever the dialectical validity standard is met. The preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence and beyond
reasonable doubt standards are ordered by the amount of proof
required, with beyond reasonable doubt requiring the most
proof. Whenever one of these standards is met, all of weaker
standards are also met.
Next we use the indigestion example to show how CAS
models the notion of argument sufficiency using proof standards. Basically, an argument is sufficient to prove its conclusion
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if it fulfills its burden of proof required to prove the conclusion.
Burden of proof is set by the standard of proof appropriate for
the argument, as determined by the user when the user puts one
of the four standards of proof defined above. So far, as shown in
figure 6, all three premises in the present example have been
accepted and are thus in, and so the conclusion is also shown in
a gray box. But in figure 7, Alice’s critical question is modeled
as an undercutter. In CAS, an undercutter is modeled as a secondary argument that attacks the original argument.

I have acid indigestion.
I should take M.

+p

My goal is to treat
my acid indigestion.
Taking M would treat
my acid indigestion.

Taking M would have
side-effects which demote
V or some other value.

It says so
on the bottle.

Gastrointestinal
bleeding demotes
the value of health.
Health is a
value for me.
Taking M could
have a side effect
of gastrointestinal
bleeding.

Figure 7: Second argument diagram for the indigestion example

In figure 7, CQ7 is represented as a con argument with a
premise stating that taking M would have side effects that demote V or some other value. The counterargument is shown not
as attacking any premise or the conclusion of the original practical reasoning argument used by Bob, but instead its argument
node is joined by an arrow to the argument node above it representing the scheme for practical reasoning. This example shows
the distinctive way in which CAS models an undercutter as one
argument attacking another. To see how CAS models this kind
of situation, we have to see how it distributes the burden of
proof in a dialogue when critical questions corresponding to an
argumentation scheme are asked.
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How strongly the audience accepts the argument can be
represented numerically in CAS. This feature can be used to
break deadlocks between an opposed pair of arguments. These
numerical weights are used by some proof standards to evaluate
arguments.
The approach taken in CAS to the problem of determining
how the burden of proof should be distributed is as follows
(Gordon and Walton, 2011). The burden of production is distributed by dividing premises into different types: evidence for
ordinary premises and assumptions (once challenged) must be
produced by the proponent of the argument, while evidence for
exceptions must be produced by the respondent. There are two
kinds of burden of proof. One is the so-called burden of persuasion set at the opening stage of dialogue. The burden of persuasion is allocated by assigning the appropriate proof standard.
The other is the so-called burden of production, sometimes also
called the evidential burden, which can shift from side to side as
the dialogue proceeds. CAS allows the burdens of production
and persuasion to be allocated separately to either the proponent
or the respondent and modified during the course of the dialogue. The initial allocation of the burden of production is regulated by the premise types of the argumentation scheme applied.
The values (in, out, undecided) of the nodes in the argument
graph are computed by the model once the user has put in
whether the audience accepts the premises or not, unless a critic
questions the assumption (No reasons or arguments need to be
put forward to question assumptions, in contrast to exceptions).
Then the argument is evaluated using the standards of proof.
Looking back to figure 7, let’s see how CAS evaluates the
argument once Alice’s move of putting forward her critical
question has been made. First it needs to be recalled that CQ7 is
classified in the scheme for practical reasoning as an exception.
This means that the burden of proof is on Alice to back up her
premise that taking M would have side effects which demote V
or some other value by offering an additional argument to support this claim. If she fails to provide such an argument, her critical question will fail to shift the burden of proof back onto
Bob’s side. But as the reader can see by looking at figure 7, Alice has provided a pro-argument supporting her exception. This
pro argument has three premises, one of which is the reused
statement that health is of value for me. Note that CAS can reuse
a premise in a different argument.
Not only that, Alice presents another pro argument to back
up her premise that taking M could have a side effect of gastrointestinal bleeding. Assuming that all the premises of Alice's

© Douglas Walton and Thomas F. Gordon. Informal Logic, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2015), pp. 508–538.

526 Walton & Gordon
counter-argument are accepted by the audience (they are assumptions), Alice has fulfilled her burden of proof to support
her assertion about the side effects of taking M. Hence CAS will
automatically remove the gray background from the text box
containing the conclusion that Bob should take M. In other
words, Alice’s critical question has undercut Bob’s original argument based on practical reasoning, and has thereby shifted the
burden of proof back onto Bob side to make another move. Bob
could respond by providing additional arguments to back up his
original argument, or by attacking Alice’s counterargument in
some appropriate way.
7. Relevance
Ballnat and Gordon (2010) provided a method of argument construction for CAS, and Walton and Gordon (2012) have shown
how the method can be applied to arguments of the kind that are
of central interest for informal logic. To apply the method, the
arguer needs to build his argument with the goal of getting the
audience to accept some designated proposition that represents
his thesis to be proved by basing his arguments on premises that
his audience either accepts or can be led to accept by argumentation. If the audience accepts the premises, and if the argument is
structurally correct by application of argumentation schemes,
the audience will also need to accept the conclusion, or give arguments to show why it should not. To use the system, an arguer
provides input on which premises the audience has accepted or
not. Then it searches for a path leading from these premises
(along with others) to the ultimate probandum. When it finds
such a path, it tells the user which premises remain to be accepted. If it finds no such path, it gives advice on what positions
could be useful to work towards finding a path.
Relevance of arguments has not yet been formally modeled in CAS, but here we can briefly outline how this research
project could plausibly be carried out, based on some previous
work in the informal logic area. One important point (Walton,
2004) is the argumentation schemes and their matching critical
questions can, in many instances, be used to determine whether
one argument is relevant to another, or whether a question or a
statement is relevant to an argument. But the problem is that a
single argumentation scheme by itself is very often not enough
to determine relevance. The reason is that in typical cases arguments are chained to each other, the conclusion of one argument
being a premise in the next. Hence proving an argument is rele-
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vant to some ultimate claim representing the issue, the conflict
of opinions in the case at issue, requires a model that can show
how the argument links up through a series of successive arguments moving toward the ultimate claim. Analyzing relevance in
such cases requires building an argument diagram, a graph
structure showing a sequence of inferences from premises to
conclusions where the sequence ultimately concludes in an endpoint.
According to the analysis of relevance in argument given
in (Walton, 2004), relevance needs to be defined and evaluated
in a tree structure comparable to argument graphs in CAS. There
needs to be a central claim, often called an ultimate probandum
in law, at the root of the tree. This framework follows the classical stasis theory well known in rhetoric (Hohmann, 1989; Freeman, 1998; Tindale, 1999). Let AG be an argument graph containing a statement node, C, for the claim. It is a conjecture
made in (Ballnat and Gordon, 2010) that an argument node, A,
in AG is relevant to C if and only if there is a path from A to C
in AG. Many examples of relevance, both in legal and ordinary
arguments, are provided in (Walton, 2004). Although CAS
could turn out to be an excellent system for modeling relevance
of this kind, so far the project of carrying out such this research
task has not yet begun.
Our proposed model of relevance, determined by the existence of a path between the argument and claim in an argument graph, seems plausible to us but remains a project for future work. Unfortunately, we have to admit that this section devoted to the topic of relevance is very short and preliminary. We
have not yet attempted to build a model of relevance. It is a centrally important topic of research for argumentation studies, but
at the same time it is a highly contested and slippery topic that is
hard to say anything very useful about in a short space. The
lack of such a model of relevance is the main reason why we do
not claim to have yet modeled all the characteristics of informal
logic, but only to have made considerable progress towards this
worthy goal.
8. Conductive Arguments
We take conductive arguments to be the same as pro-contra arguments. Whatever term you choose, the characteristic of them
as a class is that they need to be evaluated by taking into account
both the arguments for (pro) some contested claim as well as the
(contra) arguments against it, and weigh the one side against the
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other. The term ‘conductive argument’ is taken to have been
coined by Wellman (1971), but actually the way the word is
used currently in informal logic is different from the narrower
meaning of it given by Wellman. Wellman defined conductive
reasoning as meeting four requirements (1971, 52). (1) It is
about a conclusion in some individual case. (2) It is drawn inconclusively. (3) It is drawn from one or more premises about
the same case. (4) It is drawn without appeal to other cases.
Amplifying the fourth point tells us as well that the most striking feature of all the examples of conductive reasoning he has
given is that they all deal with particular cases. This definition
clearly excludes arguments from analogy as fitting under the
conductive category, since arguments from analogy compare
two different cases. However, this restriction is widely ignored
in current discussions of conductive argument. Argument from
analogy is a very important kind of argument for informal logic,
on our view. Much then depends on whether we stay with
Wellman’s meaning of the term or use it a broader way to refer
to all pro-contra argumentation. This broader way does not exclude deductive arguments. A deductive argument rebuts any
opposing defeasible argument. Opposing pro and con deductive
arguments are also possible, but cannot be in simultaneously
unless the statements accepted by the audience are inconsistent.
Wellman tells us that there are three patterns of conductive
reasoning. The first is one where a single reason is given for the
conclusion. He cited this example: “You ought to help him for
he has been very kind to you” (1971, 55). This would be the
single type of argument, of the four types classified above. The
second one is where several reasons are given to support the
conclusion. He cites this example: “You ought to take your son
to the movie because you promised, and you have nothing better
to do this afternoon” (1971, 56). This would be a convergent
argument. The third one draws the conclusion from both positive and negative considerations. He cites this example: “Although your lawn needs cutting, you want to take your son to the
movies because the picture is ideal for children and will be gone
by tomorrow” (1971, 57). The third pattern shows the paradigm
pro-contra feature of conductive arguments.
The last example can also be classified as a convergent
argument, but has an additional feature of interest. It is associated with the “balancing” notion of weighing the arguments on
both sides of a disputed issue. This notion is one that many in
the informal logic community have found so appealing while
others dismiss is it as metaphorical (Blair and Johnson, 2011).
This balance notion of deciding an issue by weighing one side
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against the other has also been found highly appealing in law,
but there too, others have strongly criticized it as an inadequate
substitute for deciding cases on the legal rules and the facts of a
case (McFadden, 1988).
Either of these arguments can be modeled by CAS, and
that may remove some of the doubts about pro-contra argument
on the ground that they are merely metaphorical. CAS models it
using the pro-contra feature, but in a different way than the arguments that McFadden objected to. He objected to it as a balance of interests, or as a balancing of factors on either side of a
disputed issue. But CAS models it as a balance between opposed arguments. Carneades can map the lawn example as
shown in figure 8.
The picture is ideal for children.
You should take your
son to the movies.
The picture will be gone tomorrow.

Your lawn needs cutting.

Figure 8: CAS argument map of Wellman’s lawn example

As shown in figure 8, the two pro arguments are “balanced” by the con argument, meaning that all three arguments
are “good” arguments that carry some evidential weight even
though none of them individually, nor any subset of them, is decisive in proving or disproving the conclusion. Should the conclusion be acceptable (in) or not? Even though there are two pro
arguments against one contra argument, the number of arguments is not the deciding factor. What is the deciding factor is
the audience. Let us presume the audience has accepted all three
of the premises. Let’s assume that family values outweigh home
care values. Then the two pro arguments, taken together, should
prevail over the contra argument.
Adler (2013) argued that conductive arguments, as they
are commonly characterized, are impossible and therefore can’t
exist. According to Adler, their property of non-conclusiveness
makes conductive arguments impossible, backing up this attack
by pointing out that Wellman never provided any definition or
explication of ‘conclusiveness’. Blair (2013) responded by arguing that Adler’s refutation of conductive arguments is based on a
misreading of the term ‘non-conclusive’ and that therefore his
dismissal of conductive argumentation fails. Much depends in
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this issue on what ‘conclusive’ and ‘inconclusive’ should be
taken to mean.
The word ‘conclusive’, as applied to arguments, is slippery and ambiguous. In one sense, it refers to the drawing of a
conclusion from a set of premises implying that this particular
conclusion has now been selected so that other conclusions no
longer need to be considered. This meaning of the word does not
rule out that the argument may have to be revised at some point
in the future, if a different conclusion is arrived at that will replace the previous one. This meaning of the term can also be
called detachability, implying that the conclusion can now be
detached from the argument used to support it or arrive at it. The
idea is that it can now be seen as separately acceptable in its
own right, and used as an acceptable premise in a new argument.
In a different meaning of the word, to say that an argument is
conclusive means that its conclusion has been proved to such a
degree of certainty that there will or should be no need to withdraw it in the future. It is easy to confuse the two meanings, and
it is not certain which of them should be taken as the best meaning of the term for logic and philosophy.
The first meaning appears to be a narrower one, whereas
the second one seems to be more important for the field of philosophy, where there is always a quest to look for an argument
or proof that is conclusive. The basic idea behind the second
meaning is that a conclusive argument leaves no room for doubt
that its conclusion is true. But this notion is philosophically controversial, because there is a school of thought in epistemology
called skepticism that claims that no real argument is so strong
(conclusive) that no room at all for doubting its conclusion is
left. But even this view can maintain that an argument is conclusive if it removes enough room for doubt so that the conclusion
can be accepted as strong enough to eliminate the need for further pro-con argumentation.
Deductive arguments are not conclusive, in the sense that
a deductive argument proves its conclusion beyond all doubt.
Deductive arguments can be attacked in two ways. First, a counterargument can be found that shows that one (or more) of the
premises of the deductive argument does not hold. Second a deductive con argument can be brought forward based on premises
more strongly accepted than the first argument, and attack it.
The first form of con argument is called a premise attack and the
second is called a rebuttal.
Conductive arguments, judging by the examples of Wellman analyzed in this paper, certainly do seem to be defeasible,
and if defeasibility implies inconclusiveness, in Adler’s sense of
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the term, then Blair is certainly right to reject Adler’s rejection
of conductive arguments. One of the merits of such arguments is
that they are distinctly different from deductive arguments precisely because they have the property of defeasibility. In any
event, an interesting issue is opened concerning what meaning
‘conclusiveness’ should be taken to have. CAS can throw some
light on this issue insofar as it relates to burdens and standards
of proof.
The default proof standard in CAS is preponderance of the
evidence, and this standard is met whenever the dialectical validity standard is met. Arguments can be weighed numerically in
CAS or not, and if they are not weighed, the dialectical validity
and preponderance of evidence standards give the same results.
The preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence
and beyond reasonable doubt standards are ordered from the
weakest to the strongest. When one is met, all of weaker standards are also met.
It should be mentioned in passing that CAS also allows
argumentation to have an opening stage, an argumentation stage
and a closing stage, bringing in the possibility of a procedural
side to the issue of how to determine conclusiveness of an argument. From a procedural point of view, an argument may be
viewed as conclusive if no further evidence or arguments may
be put forward in the dialogue, according to the procedural rules
(protocol) governing the dialogue. This depends on how the
closing stage is reached in any given case, depending on closure
rules. However, this is merely an aside, showing another of the
many sides to the controversial question of conclusiveness. Here
the main justification of our claim that CAS can model the concept of argument sufficiency rests on its use of proof burdens
and standards. Whether informal logic should be seen as dialectical or not, in our opinion, needs to be treated as a separate issue, albeit an important one for further discussions.
The proof standards presented above and the weights assigned by the audience to the arguments can at least arguably be
taken to represent a way of thinking characteristic of systems of
legal reasoning, such as adopted in the common law. But there
can also be a philosophical justification offered for supporting
the use of standards of proof in epistemology. People who take
this approach are generally categorized as qualified skeptics,
who take the view that no claim can be proved beyond all doubt,
even a claim based on an immediate perception, such as ‘I now
see a red light in front of my face’. On this skeptical view, what
determines whether a claim is justified is the weighing of the
pro and con arguments as evidence is collected and evaluated
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during a procedure of asking and answering critical questions.
For acceptance of the claim to be rationally justified, the pro arguments have to be stronger than the con arguments against it to
a degree stipulated at the opening stage of the inquiry. This degree of required strength for an argument to be a proof is called
the standard of proof.
Carneades the ancient philosopher was a qualified skeptic
who held the view that no argument is conclusive in the sense
that it proves its conclusion beyond all doubt. As skeptical philosophers such as Carneades have long argued, even the argument “I now see a red light in front of my face, therefore there is
a red light in front of my face” might turn out not to prove its
conclusion beyond all doubt, even granting that its premises are
accepted as true. For the qualified skeptic, there can be conclusive arguments, provided a conclusive argument is defined as
one that meets its standard of proof, perhaps even the very high
standard of beyond reasonable doubt. According to the qualified
skeptic, this is the highest standard that can be met by real arguments. In other words, according to this viewpoint, a conclusive argument should not be defined as one that proves its conclusion beyond all doubt, for this is a standard of proof that fallible agents can never attain.
The proof standards modeled thus far in CAS do not compare the set of pro arguments against the set of con arguments,
but rather only compare each pro argument against each con argument. Summing the weights of arguments to check if the sum
of the weights of the pro arguments outweigh the sum of the
weights of the con arguments only makes sense if the arguments
are independent, to avoid double counting. CAS can be easily
extended with further proof standards for comparing sets of pro
and con arguments, but users would need to take responsibility
to assure that these proof standards are used only when the arguments are independent.
These issues are discussed more thoroughly in (Gordon
and Walton, 2009). More could be said about how to model
Wellman’s lawn-mowing example. For example we could put in
an enthymeme stating that lawn-cutting would leave no time for
movie-going, and so forth. But basically CAS can handle the
pro-contra aspect, however you decide on the details or put in
more information about what the propositions the audience accepts, how they weigh the arguments, and what proof standards
are required.
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9. Conclusion
Have we proved that CAS allows for a representation of all informal logic-based arguments? Our answer is that we do not
claim to have proved this, since not all of the ten characteristics
have been successfully modeled, at least not in a way which
would meet with broad consensus. This applies in particular to
the characteristic of relevance. As stated at the beginning, our
proof of progress towards the goal of formalizing informal logic
is premised on the assumption that these ten characteristics are
adequate. If one does not accept this assumption, one need not
accept our claims. However, if you read our paper as a discussion of whether any formal system (particularly CAS) can fulfill
the ten postulated requirements, it is much more interesting as a
way forward to finding the relationship between formal models
of argumentation of the kind currently being in artificial intelligence and informal logic as practical set of tools for helping users identify, analyse and evaluate real arguments of the kind all
of us have to deal with every day in our professional work and
education, and indeed in all daily life.
Reconstructing arguments found in a text of natural language discourse is an informal logic skill that often requires an
ability to grasp all kinds of subtle nuances such as implicit
premises and Gricean implicature. This kind of skill can be enhanced by teaching students to use such informal logic tools as
argument diagramming and argumentation schemes. Using a
computational tool such as CAS will not automatically analyze
or evaluate arguments in natural language texts by itself (autonomously), replacing the need for such skills to be taught. But it
can help users carry out such tasks of critically assessing arguments as (1) testing whether the argument supposedly identified
in a natural language text fits an argumentation scheme, (2) finding implicit premises need to make the given argument fit the
scheme, (3) asking appropriate critical questions matching this
scheme, and (4) determining which claims are acceptable by using input concerning assumptions the audience presumably accepts.
Hence a formal argumentation system such as CAS is not
an automated informal logic that can be mechanically applied to
evaluate an argument without relying on the intuitions of a human user, or on using linguistic markers such as argument indicator words and the like. Nevertheless, as shown in this paper a
formal and computational argumentation system such as CAS,
because it has a well-defined logical structure that is applicable
to the concepts and tasks characteristic of informal logic, does
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offer a formalization of informal logic. This has been proved by
showing how the logical structure of CAS applies to key characteristics of informal logic as a working discipline designed to
carry out specific tasks.
In this paper we formulated ten characteristics of informal
logic, based on at least some of the literature that has attempted
to set them out in an orderly and clear manner, and showed why
they are identifiable with the discipline of informal logic as a
school of thought and methodology for logic. We have made our
case that CAS can model all of these characteristics within its
formal structure. We do not claim that CAS is the only formal
argumentation system that can formalize informal logic, but we
also hope we have shown that it might have some advantages for
doing it in a useful way that can be applied to “real” arguments.
Even though in this paper we did not use CAS to model the argumentation in a fairly large real case, this work has already
done elsewhere, for example in (Walton, 2013).
The weakest link in our chain of argumentation is our hypothesis that CAS can be used to model relevance. We admit
this claim requires further research. According to Johnson
(2009, 29) although there have been many attempts to develop a
theory of relevance, none of them has been entirely successful.
However, he also added (29) that sufficiency is the RSA criterion that has received the least attention, and that is where CAS is
the strongest. We claim that a strong point of CAS is its use of
proof standards to evaluate arguments. This move is unusual in
logic and epistemology, fields that have long suffered from their
failure to use proof burdens and standards to determine when
defeasible argumentation can be closed off.
There remain some differences of opinion within the informal logic community on three key issues. One is how to define a conductive argument. A second one is whether conductive
argument is essential for informal logic. In answer to an email
query of mine (Sept. 12, 2012), Ralph Johnson agreed with the
definition of conductive argument as evaluating argumentation
by taking into account the arguments for some contested claim
as well as the arguments against it, and weighing the one side
against the other. He also agreed that this type of argument was
characteristic of informal logic. Tony Blair (also on Sept. 12,
2012) had a different approach. He specified a conductive argument as one where the arguer has decided (or already determined) that the arguments for the claim in question are good
reasons for accepting it, and has also decided that the arguments
against the claim in question are good reasons for rejecting it,
but none on either side is decisive, and the strength of the com-
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bined arguments for accepting the claim outweighs the strength
of the combined arguments for rejecting it. He remarked that he
didn’t see a commitment to conductive arguments as essential
for informal logic. These matters might be clarified in Blair’s
OSSA paper on conductive argument.
The third issue is whether informal logic is dialectical.
CAS argument graphs are evaluated in stages of dialogue, as
indicated in the last example. Modeling shifts in the burden of
proof in real arguments, we have argued using the last example,
is part of the process of rational argumentation in dialogues that
in our opinion, should also be a characteristic of informal logic.
However, there are some in the informal logic community, and
very many in the formal logic and epistemology communities,
who might disagree that evaluating an argument requires reference to a conversational (dialogue) setting. On this point there
appears to be a difference of opinion in the informal logic community. Some accept dialogue structures as useful tools for informal logic methodology, while others appear reluctant to do
so. As noted in section 8, it is unclear to us how the issue of the
role of dialogue in informal logic is related to the issue of
whether or not informal logic can be formalized. These need to
be treated as separate (orthogonal) issues for the purpose of this
paper, given that we have shown that informal logic can be formalized, no matter what position one takes on the issue of the
role of dialogue in informal logic.
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